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Summary findings
Using a new data set on privatized firms in the Czech  borrowing heavily with no intent to repay and using the
Republic, Cull, Matesova, and Shirley examine how the  loans for private purposes. This looting occurred because
design of privatization affects outcomes.  the larger privatized companies had privileged access to
Earlier studies of privatization in the Czech Republic  credit from state-controlled banks, which had little
focused largely on how the broad distribution of shares  incentive to enforce debt contracts.
through vouchers may have motivated the new owners to  The policy implications are significant: financial
strip assets from privatized firms.  incentives and regulation are as important  as ownership
The authors find evidence for static asset stripping, but  structure in the design of privatization.
also for what Akerlof and Romer (1993) call looting-
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Firms are likely to gravitate to ownership structures  that yield the best
performance. Those structures are likely to differ across industries or even across
different firms in the same industry, so that one might expect little relationship between
measures of ownership structure, such as concentration levels, and relative performance.
Indeed, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) found that for a sample of U.S. firms there was no
significant relationship between ownership concentration and profit rates. They noted,
however, that ownership was relatively concentrated for the vast majority of firms in their
sample. One could interpret  those results as indicating that, in a country like the U.S.,
where equilibrium ownership  structures have been achieved and protection of minority
shareholders is adequate, small variations in concentration  have little impact on
profitability.
However, more recent evidence casts doubt on the idea that, in general, there is no
relationship between the ownership structure of a firm and its performance. Using
Tobin's Q as the measure of firm profitability, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) find a
positive relationship between profitability and ownership for ownership shares in U.S.
firms between 0 and 5 percent. For shares larger than 5 percent, they find a negative
relationship. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) provides one possible interpretation of that
finding:
"[C]onsistent  with  the  role  of  incentives  in  reducing  agency  costs,
performance  improves  with  higher  manager  and  large  shareholder
ownership at first.  Yet, as ownership gets beyond a certain point, the large
owners gain nearly full control and are wealthy enough to prefer to use
firms to generate  private benefits of control that are not shared by minority
shareholders.  Thus there are costs associated with high ownership and
entrenchment, as well as with exceptionally dispersed ownership."'
Stulz (1988) provides a formal theory of the roof-shaped relationship between ownership
concentration and firm performance,  and McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Wruck
(1989) provide additional empirical support for that proposition. 2
Outside of the U.S., little country-level evidence exists on the effects of
ownership structure on firm performance. This is largely because ownership structures
'p.  759.
2 McConnell  and Servaes,  however,  find  a positive  relation  between  profitability  and ownership
concentration  until the largest  shareholding  reaches  approximately  40%  to 50%.
3are highly concentrated in almost all other countries, which is presumably due to the
relatively weak protections afforded  minority shareholders  - potential small shareholders
do not willingly enter into an arrangement  in which they could be exploited  by larger
shareholders. 3 Because of the dispersed shareholding  that resulted from voucher
privatization programs, the transition economies offer a unique opportunity to study the
extent to which minority shareholder  expropriation  might occur. We study the Czech
experience because it represents an attempt  at voucher privatization in one of the stronger
institutional settings among transition countries, in striking contrast to failures in
institutionally weaker states, such as countries in the former Soviet Union. If we find
evidence of expropriation in the Czech Republic, one can probably assume that it would
be worse in less institutionally developed countries. Understanding the Czech case is
also important to future privatizers, who would want to know whether any failings of the
Czech privatization were due to failure to concentrate assets, failure to select for better
owners, or, as we shall show, both of these factors in combination with wider policy and
institutional failings.
The Czech Republic has increasingly  become an example for critics of voucher
privatization who argue that the free or virtually free transfer of shares in state owned
enterprises to citizens produces bad corporate governance. These critics agree that poor
corporate governan.;e and weak rule of law gave managers (and/or dominant owners) an
opportunity to strip assets from the firm for their sole benefit, rather than exert extra
effort to secure future economic returns that might have to be shared with minority
owners, a process known as "tunneling." 4 They disagree, however, on whether bad
corporate governance resulted because voucher privatization dispersed ownership too
widely or because it failed to select for better types of owners. They also do not explain
how badly run, privatized firms have managed to survive for years, presumably after all
valuable assets have been stripped, or why owners would want to purchase additional
stock to concentrate their shares, as happened quickly in the Czech Republic. 5
3 Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
4 Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes  and Shleifer  2000 defines tunnelling as "the transfer of assets and
profits out of firms for the benefit of their controlling shareholders."
World Bank 1998 found that firms where the largest  owners held more than 50% of shares increased from
1% of all listed firms in 1993 to 38% in 1997, and those where the largest owner held 30 to 50% increased
from 6 to 35% of all listed firms over the same period.
4The case that failure to concentrate ownership resulted in poor performance is
made in Weiss and Nikitin 1998, which argues that the initial wide dispersion of
ownership and rules limiting share ownership for some investors meant that voucher-
privatized Czech firms had no single concentrated owner who was motivated and capable
of exercising control over managers. This separation of ownership and control was
exacerbated by the fact that most voucher shares were held by investment funds. Weiss
and Nikitin 1998 and World Bank 1998 suggest that the closed ended nature of many of
these funds, which meant that shares could not be redeemed, gave shareholders  no way to
discipline fund managers, and this in turn gave fund managers no incentive to monitor
actively the managers of the enterprises. World Bank 1998 further argues that the
management contracts that were written to block most takeovers, virtually eliminated  the
market for corporate control. The weak to nil enforcement  of legal protection of minority
shareholders gave small shareholders little chance to replace managers who ignored  their
interests.
Claessens and Djankov 1999,  however, finds that ownership concentration has in
fact increased rapidly in the Czech Republic, and contrary to Weiss and Nikitin 1998,
they find only weak association between concentration and improved performance. They
show that certain types of owners (foreign strategic  or investment funds not sponsored  by
banks), rather than concentration per se, is more significant in improving performance.
Claessens and Djankov 1999, Weiss and Nikitin 1998, and World Bank 1998,
agree that the poor performance of many privatized firms is due to tunneling. Tunneling
is essentially a static form of exploitation that ends when the firm's resources are
exhausted. It would not explain why owners would want to purchase additional stock to
concentrate their shares or how such firms continued to survive despite apparently  wide-
spread asset stripping.
We believe that tunneling did take place, but that another activity, looting,
allowed managers and dominant owners of firms with privileged access to credit to make
dynamic gains. Akerlof and Romer 1993 (AR) show that looting is likely when the
expected future economic value of a firm is less than the amount that owners can
currently pay themselves. Looting, as described by AR, arises when a government
guarantees a firm's debt obligations, such that owners can borrow heavily, extract funds
5from the firm, and default on-the debt without penalty. As AR point out, "optimizing-
individuals will not repeatedly lend on terms that let them be exploited..." but "this
premise may not apply to lending arrangements  undertaken by the government."  AR
suggest that looting is likely where there is poor accounting, lax regulation, and low
penalties for abuse, the same weaknesses that also make asset stripping possible. Unlike
tunneling, where most of the cost of bad behavior is borne largely by non-controlling
shareholders, looting spreads costs to taxpayers as well. And the apparently healthy firm
can sign contracts with non-looted firms, which will then suffer and may go under when
the looted firm eventually collapses. Another serious problem, especially for a
transitional economy like the Czech Republic, is that looting diverts credit from more
productive firms, choking off new entrants and slowing the transition. While AR focused
on financial enterprises that go bankrupt for profit, we will extend their model to non-
financial firms that continue to exist, but end up as hollowed out shells.
Both looting and tunneling occur in many, similar ways. Funds can be extracted
by owners paying themselves large dividends or high salaries, or by the firm making
loans or investments in straw companies set up by the owners, buying assets from the
straw at inflated prices or selling assets at deep discounts, or making concessional loans
to owners.  It could, but does not necessarily, involve fraud.
Three factors made static tunneling and dynamic looting probable outcomes of
Czech privatization. First, shares in the voucher privatized firms were widely dispersed
and sold for virtually no initial capital investment  to citizens, which gave Czech minority
owners little incentive to monitor and dominant owners or managers little reason not to
transfer the firm's assets to their own accounts. Even if minority shareholders  were
motivated to protect their interests, lax security laws "accommodated" tunneling, most of
which was "probably legal under the existing Czech law" (Johnson and Shleifer 1999, p.
23).6  Second, the government retained part (40-50%) ownership of the four largest banks
and gave them few incentives to be assertive in collecting debts or scrutinizing loan
6 For example,  trades  did  not have  to take  place  on an exchange,  ownership  did not have  to be disclosed,
those acquiring  large  blocks  of shares  did not have  to buy  out minority  shareholders,  self-dealing
transactions  by shareholders  with controlling  board  seats  were  hard  for minority  to even  discover,  much
less  overturn. See Coffee  1999  and  Johnson  and  Shleifer  1999.
6applicants. 7 Regulatory and other barriers to new bank entry combined with incumbent
advantages protected the "big four" from competition, while implementation of the
bankruptcy law was delayed and poorly enforced (Brom and Orenstein 1994). A state-
owned bank (Consolidation Bank or KOB) set up to clear non-performing loans from the
large bank portfolios was transformed from a temporary "hospital" for bad loans
inherited from the communist era to a "state-run commercial  debt-alleviation agency"
(Desai 1996). Some observers argue that the government went further and encouraged
banks to lend to the large voucher privatized firms to avoid bankruptcies that might
discredit the reform program or lead to politically costly unemployment (Desai 1996;
Brom and Orenstein 1994).  Third, the "big four" banks had long-standing creditor
relationships with the voucher privatized SOEs, which made up the bulk of their
portfolios, and had also made equity investment in these firms through their voucher
investment funds. Thus, they had a strong incentive to prop up troubled firms through
further lending and rollovers (Phelps et al. 1993, Hrncir 1993, Capek 1994, Brom and
Orenstein 1994, Desai 1996).
Understanding the interaction between looting and privatization in the Czech
Republic is important. If the Czech failures are largely due to the poor design of an
idiosyncratic give-away scheme that resulted in weak corporate governance that
motivated tunneling, then the main lesson is simple: avoid vouchers/concentrate
ownership when privatizing in environments with weak protection of minority
shareholders (i.e. most developing countries). If, however, they are due to a combination
of weak corporate governance  and perverse incentives  in the banking system, then the
lessons are complex and have much wider applicability. We cannot estimate the extent to
which static tunneling took place, but we can show evidence consistent with looting.
Although looting is hard to identify directly, since it is by its nature hidden, we can find
evidence for it by comparing leverage and performance across ownership types.  The
most important contribution  of this paper is that, unlike other papers on the Czech
privatization, which only have information on the large joint stock companies that were
part of the voucher privatization,  we can also compare the joint stock companies with
limited liability firms (largely sole proprietorships)  that had far less potential for looting.
7Bonin  and Wachtel (2000).
7That is, because there was no separation  between ownership and control rights for limited
liability companies, relatively strong performance  by them would provide one indication
that expropriation of minority shareholders  occurred at joint stock companies.
In the next section we adapt the AR model to fit the circumstances  of the Czech
Republic.  In section 3 we provide background  on the Czech privatization  process and
describe our dataset.  Section 4 contains testable hypotheses, which focus on how the
Czech privatizations resulted in ownership forms with different incentives  for looting.
Section 5 presents results on the performance  of different ownership forms and their
borrowing. Section 6 provides a series of robustness checks on our basic empirical
results.  Section 7 concludes and draws implications for privatization  in transitional
economies.
2.  A  Theory of Looting
The AR model begins without any perverse incentives. A firm is created in
period zero with an initial investment  by its owners equal to WO.  The firm then takes on
liabilities Lo  and purchases a bundle of assets,  A, whose initial value is Ao = WO  + Lo. In
the Czech case, the firm's liabilities were typically incurred through bank loans.  We also
assume that the firm must be solvent to continue operations. Therefore, its net worth WO
must be greater than or equal to cAo  for some constant c.  The assets purchased by the
firm yield a cash payment of pl(A) in period 1 and  p2(A) in period 2. For simplicity, the
AR model assumes that the firms' assets cannot be sold and that the firm does not
purchase any new assets after period zero.
In period 1, the firm receives its net operating profitspi(A) and pays a dividend A,,
to its owners. To facilitate this transaction, the firm adjusts its liabilities so that, after the
transaction, the firm's net liabilities will include the liabilities from the previous period
with accumulated interest, (1  +rl) Lo, minus its operating profits pi(A), plus its dividend
payment Al.  The period 1 net liabilities relationship implies that the firm can borrow to
finance its dividend payment (Table 1).
8In period 2, the firm's assets yield their last operating profits p2(A) and the owners
liquidate the firm. Net liabilities carry over from period 1, and must be financed. With
accumulated interest those net liabilities can be expressed as
(I+r2ff(1+ri)Lo +,d -pi(A)]  (1)
The firm's terminal net worth, which devolves  to its owners, is merely the difference
between its assets and its liabilities. The firm's owners, therefore, choose A and di to
maximize their total discounted net profits. In period 2 units, that maximization  problem
can be expressed as
MAXA., p2(A) - (J+r 2)[(J+rd)Lo  +Al -p/(A)]+  (1+r 2),A  (2)
subject to O￿  cAo  SWo
The first term,  p2(A), is the operating profits that devolve to the owners in period 2; the
second, (I +r2)[(J +rd)Lo  +Al -pl(A)], is the net financing obligation between periods 1
and 2; and the third, (I +r2)A,, is the period 2 value of the period 1 dividend payment.
Note that Al cancels out of this expression since the owners are paying the dividend to
themselves. For ease of exposition, AR eliminate  the dividend component of the
maximization problem and re-express it in period 1 units:
V  = MAXA [p2(A)/(J+r2)] - (I+rd)Lo + pI(A)  (3)
subject to O￿  cAo < Wo
To this point the objective of the owners is simply to choose the bundle of assets
A to maximize the present discounted value of the payments from the firm. However, the
situation changes once we suppose that the firm's owners face limited liability, and that
the government guarantees the firm's liabilities in some way, perhaps through deposit
insurance.  In the Czech case, firm owners did face limited liability and losses associated
with non-performing bank loans to Czech firms were not in practice imposed on banks'
depositors, despite the absence of a formal deposit insurance scheme.
As in the AR model, we assume that the combination of limited liability and
(implicit) deposit insurance prompts the government to impose an upper bound M(A) on
9the amount of dividends that the firm can pay to its owners in period 1.8 Note that the
dependence of Mon A was deliberately  chosen to reflect an important aspect of the
owners' underlying incentives. This dependence can encourage owners to assume
liabilities (L) to invest in negative net value projects (A), simply in order to increase their
period 1 dividend. Note also that the limit on period 1 dividends, M(A),  is given only by
regulatory and accounting rules, so all decisions about asset purchases and dividend
payments made by firm owners continue to be legal. A weak legal framework, therefore,
can affect owner behavior, and these changes are independent of any deliberately
fraudulent activities that they might undertake. We incorporate owner incentives to
engage in fraud below.
s In the Czech case this limit was set by the commercial code's requirements for a minimum level of capital
and a reserve fund in readily realizable assets equivalent to 20% of the minimum capital requirement (Gray
1992).
10Table 1
Summary of Basic Model
Period 0:  Initial Investment by Owners, Purchase of Productive Assets
Choose Ao = Wo  + Lo,  subject to Wo  2 c Ao
Period 1: Firm Earns Period 1 Profits; Owners Receive Dividend; Liabilities are
Financed
Firm's Net Position:  pi(A) - A, - (I +r) Lo
Period 2:  Firm Earns Period 2 Profits; Finance Net Liabilities from Period 1; Owners
Liquidate Firm (If Still in Operation)
Firm's Net Position:  p2(A) - (1  +r2)[(1  +rd)Lo  +Ai -pi(A)]
With limited liability, implicit deposit insurance, and the government-imposed
limit on A,, the owners' decision becomes more complicated. They can choose A to
remain solvent, pay themselves A, SM(A) in period 1, continue to operate through period
2, and then pay themselves A2 =p2(A) - (I+r2)[(1+rd)Lo  +a, -pl(A)].  This option is the
same as described in the basic model, except that there is now a limit on the period 1
dividend. The owners also have a second alternative. They can pay themselves Al S
M(A) in period 1, and then ignore any losses incurred in period 2, because those will be
assumed by the government on behalf of the depositors that underwrote the bank loans to
the firm. In that case, the owners receive A2 = 0 in period 2.  The owners' decision
problem can be expressed, in period 1 units, as maximizing E, their own equity position:




A2 <max (0, p2(A) - (1  +r 2)[(J+r,)Lo  +Aj -pi(A)]}
AR define M* as the maximum of M(A) over all choices of A satisfying O  <cAo <
WO.  M  is the maximum dividend that can be extracted in period 1. The key result of the
model is that, if M* is less than V*  (the period 1 maximum  value of the firm's flow of
payments to its owners from equation (3)), the owners choose A to maximize the
economic value of the firm. However, if MA  is greater than V, the owners choose option
two.  That is, they choose A to maximize M(A), pay a dividend equal to M* in period 1,
and default on the firm's obligations in period 2. In other words, if limited liability and
government guarantees of the firm's liabilities are in place, the owners may have strong
incentives to pay themselves high dividends in period 1, and discontinue operations in
period 2.  This incentive is increasing in M(A), which implies that, in weak accounting
and regulatory environments,  firm owners are more likely to adopt this strategy. In
addition, M  is likely to be greater than V if productive capabilities are low (i.e., p,(A)
and p2(A) are small), or the cost of financing liabilities is high (i.e., ri and r2 are large).
A key feature of the Czech case may have been the fraudulent activities
undertaken by some classes of firm owners. To incorporate fraud into the model, we
follow AR and let F denote the fraudulent activities undertaken by firm owners. We
assume that an increase in F increases the expected cost of being caught and prosecuted
by the authorities, which we denote C(F). This expected cost will also incorporate the
attitudes towards risk of the owners and the reputation costs associated will legal action.
We hypothesize that C(F) was greater for foreign-owned firms because of greater
potential reputation costs. That is, looting by foreign firms may have affected negatively
their reputations in markets outside the Czech Republic. Therefore, for a given level of
fraudulent activity, foreign-owned  firms stood to lose more than their Czech-owned
counterparts.
F not only imposes costs on owners, it also conveys benefits as it represents an
increase in the amount of total resources that can be extracted by the owners. As AR
note, "these resources would not take the form of explicit dividend payments, but they
12still represent reductions in the net worth of the institutions." They should, therefore, be
reflected in the firm's balance sheet and in the optimization problem that we model. We
incorporate these benefits by expanding  M(A), the limit on first period wealth extraction,
to include F.  We denote the new limit M(A, F), and assume that M is increasing in both
A and F.  For simplicity, we assume that M(A, F) = g(A) + h(F). That is, Mis additively
separable in A and F.  The definition  of M  becomes
M  = MAXA,F M(A,F)  = MAXAF  g(A)  +h(F)  =g*(A)  +h*(F)  (5)
Owners will again loot if M*  is greater than V*. That is, owners will loot if
g  (A) + h *(F)  > MAXA  [p2(A)/(J+r2)] - (J+r,)Lo  + pI(A)  (6)
To further adapt the AR model to the Czech situation, we introduce shareholding
arrangements. Let ni- [0,1  ] be the share of the firm in the hands of owner i. If the owner
is the sole proprietor (n, = 1) , or if the firm is owned by a group of owners that can
effectively monitor each other's actions,  the looting decision remains unchanged for each
owner. In deciding whether to loot, each owner simply multiplies each side of equation
(6) by ni.
However, if the benefits of fraudulent activities devolve only to one owner or to a
small group of owners, while the other benefits and costs are shared on a pro-rated basis,
the calculation changes. For example, if a firm were widely held, except for one
dominant controlling shareholder i, we would expect that shareholder  to make production
and investment decisions, and we would expect him to loot if
ni g (A) + h *(F)  > MAXA  n, ([p2(A)/(l +r 2)]  - (I +ri)Lo  + pi(A))  (7)
Dividing both sides of (7) by ni yields
g (A) + h *(F)/ni > MAXA [p2(A)/(1+r]  - (I+r )Lo  + pi(A)  (8)
Since ni- [0,1],
g (A) + h  *(F)/nhi  g  *(A) + h (F) (9)
13That is, the left hand side of -equation  (8) is greater than or equal to the left hand side of
(6), which implies that a controlling shareholder in a widely held firm is more likely to
loot than a sole proprietor of the same firm would be.  Moreover, as n, increases, the
likelihood of looting on the part of the controlling shareholder approaches that for the
sole proprietor. In other words, as the controlling shareholder owns more of the firm, the
incentive to choose A to maximize the present discounted value of the payments from the
firm increases, and the incentive to steal decreases. 9
We should state at the outset that we lack the data necessary to test directly
whether the incentive to loot declines as the controlling  shareholder owns more of a firm.
However, in those cases where one existed, we can identify the type of controlling
shareholder in joint stock companies. Unlike other studies, we also have data for a large
number of limited liability companies, which tend to be owned by a sole proprietor and
not to have access to implicitly guaranteed  debt. Our basic strategy, therefore, is to
demonstrate that, all else equal, limited liability companies outperformed joint stock
companies with controlling shareholders. We will also investigate whether, despite their
relatively poor performance,  joint stock companies became more leveraged than others.
Taken together, these two types of evidence should help confirm the looting hypothesis.
3.  Background and Data
At the time of the "velvet revolution," almost the entire economy of the former
Czechoslovakia was state owned. 10  The government first auctioned about 24,000 smaller
firms.  Starting in 1991, the government converted many of the medium and large
enterprises, about 1,700 firms, into  joint stock companies and divested them through a
combination of methods dominated by a voucher privatization scheme. In some of these
firms the dominant owner was a foreign strategic  investor; but in most, ownership was
dominated by investment funds.  Many smaller state firms were sold to a dominant
owner for cash and became limited liability companies. The state retained majority
ownership of the large utilities and the banks.
9  Johnson, Boone, Breach,  and Friedman (1998) provide a very similar model to explain why
owner/managers of  East Asian firms were less likely to engage in theft during the crisis if they held a
higher share of their firm.
14Under the Czech privatization  scheme, all citizens eighteen or older could buy a
package of vouchers worth 1000  points for a nominal fee (equivalent to about $35). They
could use these points to bid directly for shares in the enterprises that were being
privatized, or they could offer their points to one or several of the more than 550
investment funds that came into existence  just prior to the auctions. The funds captured
more than two thirds of the voucher points.  The investment  funds used their accumulated
points to bid for shares on behalf of their "investors.""
Our sample comes from a slightly later time period than other authors have used
to study the Czech Republic, and, unlike the others, includes limited liability
companies.  12 A breakdown of the sample by firm type appears in Table 2; a breakdown
by size (total assets) for each type of firm appears in Table 3.  The data cover 1993-96
and just under half of the total observations are for limited liabilities. We have 1017 total
observations from 392 firms, roughly 2.5 observations per firm. Observations are
divided nearly evenly between 1994, 1995, and 1996 (very few observations come from
l993). "
Most studies have followed  Demsetz and Lehn (1985) in measuring ownership
concentration by either summing a firm's largest five ownership shares or creating a
Herfindahl index by summing  the squared shares for the five largest owners.  14 While
those are good measures of concentration, they are not necessarily accurate measures of
10  Czechoslovakia  split  into  the Czech  and  Slovak  Republics  in 1993;  for  ease  of reference  we use
the term  Czech  Republic  throughout.
I  I  rDetails  on the Czech  privatization  scheme  are drawn  from  Claessens,  Djankov,  and Pohl  (1997),
Weiss  and  Nikitin  (1998),  van  Wijnbergen  and Marcinin  (1995),  and Shafik  (1995).
12  These include  Pohl  et al.  (1997),  Frydman  et al. (1997),  and  Weiss  and  Nikitin  (1998). Although
Weiss and Nikitin (1998) does not include data from limited liability companies, it does cover the same
time  period  that  we do.
13  The number  of limited  liabilities  increases  through  1995  (as  more  firms  are privatized)  and  holds
constant  in 1996. By contrast,  the number  of  joint stock  companies  increases  in 1994,  holds  roughly  steady
in 1995,  and declines  in 1996.  We are unsure  whether  this occurred  because  some  joint stock  companies
went out of business  or, as is more  likely,  some  merely  failed  to provide  1996  data  by the time  our  sample
was  collected.  One might  argue  that  poor performers  are less  likely  to report;  and  they certainly  would  be
more  likely  to go bankrupt. A sample  selection  bias  could,  therefore,  arise  in favor  of the better  performing
joint stock companies.  However,  our  hypothesis  is that limited  liabilities  out-performed  joint stock
companies.  The sample  selection  bias  discussed  here should  make  it more  difficult  to confirm  that
hypothesis,  which  should  inspire  greater  confidence  in  the regression  results  that  follow.
14  An exception  is Frydman  et al. (1997)  which  classifies  firms  by their largest  shareholder  and then
measures  performance  differences  across  firm  types. A drawback  to that  approach  is that  if an investment
fund were the largest shareholder  in two different firms, those firms would be put in the same group, even
if the fund owned 50.1% of the shares in the first firm (a case of clear control) and only 25% of the shares
in the second.
15control as discussed in the governance literature. Consider a hypothetical firm (A) where
one shareholder owns 50.1% of total shares and no other shareholder  has more than 1%.
Control of that firm would be clear-cut. Now consider firm (B) where three large
shareholders each own one-third of the total shares. On the Demsetz/Lehn concentration
measures, firm (B) would outscore firm (A) but, in our view, ascertaining who had actual
control of firm (B) would be more difficult than for firm (A).
Rapid ownership changes also introduce error in concentration measures. In the
Czech Republic, secondary market activity produced steadily increasing ownership
concentration in joint stock companies (Claessens et al, (1997) and World Bank (1998)).
This meant that the ownership structure at the beginning of a year was not necessarily the
ownership structure responsible for performance  throughout the year. These problems
are compounded because our dataset on performance came from a different source than
our data on ownership, and because the Byzantine links between funds, individual
investors, the companies themselves, and subsidiaries made it very difficult to track
which shareholders were inter-linked and thus voted as a block. Our view is that any
current measure of effective control in the Czech Republic is subject to substantial
measurement error. To minimize that error we have classified firms based not only on
(1) our data on ownership shares, but also on (2) phone interviews with regulatory
agencies and the firms themselves, and (3) the reservoir of experience that one of the
authors (Matesovi) has in conducting surveys  and dealing with individual  firms in the
Czech Republic.
4.  Looting - Testable Hypotheses
Part A - Systematic Under-performance  by Czech Joint Stock Companies
The model in Section 2 has several testable implications for our sample of Czech
firms, especially for comparisons between limited liability and joint stock companies.
The trends in ownership after the voucher privatization made the looting of joint stock
companies more likely than of limited liabilities. The initial allocations of shares were
widely dispersed, much more widely than the LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes,  and Shleifer
16(1998) results would predict given the Czech Republic's weak legal system.'5 As noted,
ownership ofjoint stock companies became increasingly  concentrated over time and, as a
result, ownership of many Czech joint stock companies was characterized by one or few
dominant and many minority shareholders. In contrast, limited liability companies are
generally sole proprietorships  or close partnership of very few owners.
In addition to differences in ownership structure, the incentives of owners differ
between the two forms. Each owner of a company eventually organized as a limited
liability paid the equivalent of at least $3,000 to obtain the firm's assets. We presume
that these investors were unlikely to part with their funds unless any control issues had
been resolved to their satisfaction.' 6 Since voucher points required only a nominal fee,
investors in joint stock companies were putting virtually none of their own capital at risk.
Thus, in terms of our model, the initial investment  was not equal to the firm's net worth
Wo,  except in the artificial accounting of the voucher privatization system, adding to the
incentive of owners of joint stock companies to loot (or not to exert costly effort to
scrutinize looting managers). For all these reasons, we would therefore expect
performance of limited liabilities  to be better than that of joint stock companies.
Foreign owners of joint stock companies may have had incentives  to behave
differently. We assume that foreign owners are more likely to have a reputation at stake,
and that damage to it could affect their ability to attract external finance for future
15  The dispersion in shareholding is, in part, attributable  to the limits imposed by the Czech
government on the fraction of a firm's total shares that any single investor (individual or fund) could
accumulate through the voucher privatization process.
16  In some  cases  there  was  non-cash  investment  in  these  companies,  but the value  of the assets
pledged was required to exceed $3,000. In other cases a limited liability company was established that later
established subsidiary limited liability companies. No additional capital was required to create the
subsidiaries.  Despite  these minor exceptions, we are confident that the disciplining effects of external
finance were, on average, present in transactions  that established the limited liabilities, and that such effects
were much less important in the transactions that established the joint stock companies.
Van Wijnbergen and Marcinin (1995) provides evidence  on bidding activity that could be
interpreted as indicative of small investor fears over corporate governance. They note that individuals and
investment funds bought roughly comparable shares in small enterprises, but that funds invested
substantially more in larger ones. They also note that private individuals had their peak purchases of shares
in large companies in the last auction round thereby following  the funds "at a safe distance in time," and
that the prices paid for shares in the same company tended to be somewhat lower at the end of the auction
than those paid by funds in prior rounds. This may indicate  that small investors, worried about the prospect
of expropriation by larger shareholders, waited to learn what they could about future control prior to
committing their points.
17activities both in the Czech Republic and abroad.1 7 While we ackn6wledge that some
Czech owners could also be trying to establish such reputations, we argue that the foreign
firms in our sample (e.g., Levi Strauss) are, on average, much more likely to be
disciplined by reputation and capital markets. In terms of our model, their cost of fraud
C(F) was therefore larger than Czech  joint stock companies.
In addition, superior regulatory and accounting standards in their home country
likely made it more difficult foreign owners of joint stock companies to increase their
legal dividend payments or hide diverted assets as much as they could have under Czech
regulation.  In other words, foreign firms likely had lower M(A) in the basic model, or
g(A) in the model that incorporates fraud. Thus, in the basic model, M* for foreign
owners was more likely to be greater than V*,  so they were more likely than Czech
owners to choose A to maximize the economic value of the firm. We expect, therefore,
that foreign-controlled joint stock companies would have outperformed other joint stock
companies.
Part B - Access to Finance
For multi-period looting to have taken place, joint stock companies needed
a renewable source of liabilities, such as loans. The proceeds of loans could then be
siphoned to the controlling owner through various methods.  The largest banks in the
Czech Republic were those that were carved out of the old monobank  that operated under
the communist regime, and the state retained substantial ownership in those banks
throughout the period under study.  1 8 For reasons that we explained in Section I, it is
unlikely that depositors at these banks ever felt their deposits were truly at risk or that
they paid attention to the reputation of these banks. Nor were these banks subject to
regulatory discipline or competition.  Because of the importance of the joint stock
17  Others have suggested that superior  performance by foreign-owned  firms derives from expertise.
Frydman et al. (1997) notes that, "[F]inancial  resources, managerial know-how, and corporate governance
expertise of foreign strategic investors are often seen as giving an instant advantage  to the firms in which
they invest."  p.20.  Our view does not differ from theirs to the extent that know-how and expertise spring
forth from a desire to establish a good reputation  with investors and thus attract the financial resources that
they mention.
is  Meyendorff and Snyder (1997) notes that, "In the Czech Republic,  the banks hived off from the
monobank and the forrner specialty  banks control over 80% of the country's banking assets." p.6.  Bonin
and Wachtel (1998, p. 1 1) found that even as late as 1997 the government owned 36 to 65% of the four
largest banks.
18companies as creditors whose bad debts in the past have been forgiven or rolled over, we
expect them to have more access to implicitly  guaranteed loans than limited liability
companies.
One subset of joint stock companies deserves special mention. Banks sponsored
many of the Czech investment funds and eventually acquired 44% of all voucher  points
(Claessens et al., 1997). Firms controlled  by bank-sponsored funds may have had an
advantage in attracting bank loans, which could have increased their opportunities for
looting. In the context of the model,  joint stock companies controlled by those
investment funds that were sponsored by banks may have been best able to obtain bank
loans (through lower r1 and r2) that could be converted into period 1 payments (AM).  We




We focus on two measures of performance  - return on assets (ROA) and the
output growth rate.  1 9 The regression results in Table 4 report performance  for each firm
type relative to the omitted category - Czech owned limited liability companies. We also
control for industry, year, and size (total assets). To reiterate, we expected limited
liabilities to outperform  joint stock companies because their ownership was more
concentrated; owners paid money (rather than voucher points) to acquire productive
assets; and their opportunities to borrow were less likely to be subject to political
influence. The ROA regressions on columns (1) and (2) strongly confirm the hypothesis
that these firms performed better. Coefficients  for all types of joint stock companies
were negative and significant compared to the Czech limited liability companies using
standard OLS regression. The few state owned enterprises in our sample perform better
than all the joint stock companies in these and the other regressions, and are statistically
19  In the spirit  of Morck,  et al. (1988),  Claessens,  et al. (1997)  used  Tobin's-Q  (the  ratio  of the
market  value  of the firn to the replacement  value  of the net fixed  assets  of the firm)  as a level  measure  of
perforrnance.  Market  values  were  calculated  using  share  prices  from  the stock  market. Because  we include
limited  liabilities  in our sample  that  are not  publicly  traded,  Tobin's  Q was  not a viable  option. Moreover,
disparities  between  share  prices  on  the stock  exchange  and  the informal  market,  and  unreliable  estimates  of
19indistinguishable from the limited liabilities, but we suspect that the sample of SOEs
tracked by Dun and Bradstreet may be biased in favor of better performers. 20
We also expected  joint stock companies controlled by investment funds to
perform at least as poorly as other joint stock companies. Coefficients in the ROA
regressions were negative and larger (in absolute value) for fund-controlled companies
than for any other sub-group  of firms. However, in the regressions that pool data from
1993 to 1996, they were not statistically distinguishable  from those for foreign-owned
joint stock companies, nor for joint stock companies where a dominant fund could not be
identified. Although strategic investors were increasing their holdings during this period
in many of the firms where a dominant shareholder  was not identified, total shareholding
often remained widely dispersed . We therefore expected  their performance in the
aggregate to be mixed, but somewhat better than fund-controlled  joinit stock companies, if
looting by dominant shareholders  was widespread. Although the OLS results for the
pooled sample do not confirm that expectation, we present results in the robustness
checks section that do.
We also expected  joint stock companies controlled by bank-sponsored investment
funds to be more able to loot due to their privileged access to credit from state banks, and
hence to perform worse than limited liability companies and all other types of joint stock
companies.  With the exception of the leverage regressions, which we describe below, we
found firms controlled by bank-sponsored fund to be statistically indistinguishable  from
those controlled by other funds. In the rest of the performance regressions in the paper,
we group all fund-controlled  joint stock companies into one category.
A common problem in studies of governance and firm performance in the Czech
Republic is poor data quality. Studies that have used data from surveys encountered
difficulties in gauging how respondents interpreted questions, while those using data
from firm balance sheets confronted weak accounting standards. Because of the
substantial measurement  errors that ensued, regression results were often quite sensitive
to individual observations (outliers). We dealt with this problem in two ways. We first
the replacement  value  of the net fixed  assets  for our  firms  would  have  introduced  substantial  measurement
error had  we limited  our  analysis  only  to joint stock  companies.
20  Few SOEs  are included  and  they  are much larger  than most  firms  in the sample. The  results  do
not differ if they are excluded.
20tried to eliminate obvious cases of measurement error and then applied standard
estimation techniques. Next, we employed robust estimation techniques using all
available observations.2' We find relatively consistent results for both methods.
To eliminate obvious cases of measurement error, we first limrited  our sample to
only those firms with balance sheets that were internally consistent.22  We then
eliminated firms with extreme  values for return on assets (less than -50%).  In most
cases, firms with ROA below -50 percent had large inconsistencies  between their balance
sheets and their operating statements. In specification 3, which eliminates observations
that had ROA less than -50%, the significant  coefficients for the pooled sample (1993 to
1996) indicate that joint stock companies generated returns on assets 5-6 percentage
points lower than the typical Czech limited liability company. However, specification 3
differs from the first two in one key respect. Unlike the Czech joint stock companies, the
performance of foreign owned  joint stock companies is not statistically  distinguishable
from that of the limited liabilities.
One final difficulty is that our data come from an environment  where there is
some corruption. Controlling shareholders  and managers may, therefore, have incentives
to answer survey questions and construct balance sheets that mask their activities. Our
sense is that it may be easier to hide some things than others and that, as a result, some of
our measures may display greater sensitivity to ownership structure than others.
Frydman et al. (1997, 1999)  argue that the output growth rate is a very sensible measure
of performance. One of its primary advantages may be that it is more easily measured
than other variables or that managers  have less reason to mis-represent it.  As in the
ROA regressions, the output growth  regressions show fund-controlled  joint stock
companies to be the weakest performers  (specifications 5 and 6). However, in the pooled
21  Frydman et al (1997) computed annualized growth rates of performance  measures over their entire
period of interest (1990-93), "to smooth out year-to-year variations." A later  paper, Frydman et al. (1999),
does, however, include regressions of yearly growth rates upon levels of ownership. That paper also
attempts to control for sample selection  problems with respect to ownership  structure by including initial
performance levels and firm-specific  fixed effects in some regressions. Weiss and Nikitin (1998) uses
robust estimation techniques to confront this problem.
22  Internal consistency implies that the basic accounting identity, Assets=Liabilities+Equity,  held.
We also required that the sum of the sub-categories  of assets matched the total assets entry in the balance
sheet, and that the sub-categories  of liabilities summed to the total liabilities entry.
23  Frydman et al. (1997) argues that another major advantage of the output growth rate is that it
better captures entrepreneurship than other  variables. The obvious drawback is that it ignores costs and
thus provides information about only one aspect of economic performance.
21models, their performance was statistically  indistinguishable  from other joint stock
companies.2 4
While we expected all limited liability companies to do better than joint stock
companies, we also expected foreign-owned  limited liability companies to outperform
Czech limited liabilities due to reputation effects and technological know-how.
However, in the ROA pooled regressions, estimated coefficients were:  negative, though
insignificant, in the specifications  that control for outliers (3-4). In the output growth
regressions, coefficients were positive, but insignificant.  In general, however, the base
results provide strong support for the hypothesis that Czech joint stock companies under-
performed limited liabilities, and some support for the hypothesis that foreign-owned
joint stock companies out-performed Czech ones. The robustness checks section will
make these distinctions even clearer.
B. Leverage
The regressions in Table 5 indicate that joint stock companies have become
substantially more leveraged than the limited liabilities or state owned enterprises over
time, with firms controlled by bank-sponsored  investment funds leading the way.  We
measure leverage as the ratio of total liabilities  to total assets. One might argue that the
joint stock companies had artificially low leverage  ratios due to the voucher privatization
process, and we may just be witnessing the equilibration process. The levels regression
indicates that joint stock companies were indeed less leveraged on average during the
period than either limited liability companies or state-owned enterprises (specifications 1-
3).
24  In addition, we also controlled for liability  growth rates in the output growth regressions (results
not reported). Our thinking was that firms might borrow for looting, but they may also borrow to expand
faster or invest in improvements in efficiency. By including  the liability growth rate in our output growth
rate regressions, therefore, we tested whether firm types varied in their abilities to convert a given change
in liabilities into new output or higher returns. The positive relationship between the growth rates of
outputs and liabilities suggests that debt obligations were, at least in part, used to acquire productive
resources.  In standard production functions one obviously needs to account for inputs. We lack reliable
data on either capital accumulation or changes in labor input, and thus must rely on liability  growth as a
proxy in our output growth regressions.  Controlling for the rate at which new liabilities were incurred, we
then compare the performance of the ownership classes. Qualitative results do not differ substantially  from
those presented in specifications 5 and 6 of Table 4.
We also included the liability growth rate in regressions where the dependent variable was return
on assets. The connection between the liability growth rate and that variable is less straightforward,
22We suspect that this largely reflected the post-privatization  starting points for the
various classes of firms.  Schwartz  (1997) notes that, prior to privatization, many larger
firms were given subsidies by state banks from the Fund for National Property (FNP)
that could have reduced their liabilities and thus improved their balance sheets. 25 Hayri
and McDermott (1998) also asserts that FNP funds were used to finance debt write-offs
and purchases of loans at state banks. Furthermore, the voucher privatization process
assured that no liabilities would be incurred to acquire the firm, which may account for
some of the disparity. Lower initial leverage may have been an advantage to joint stock
companies and this, conceivably, could be reflected in higher return on assets and greater
output growth. To bias our results against our hypothesis that joint stock companies
under-performed, therefore, we did not include initial leverage in our base performance
regressions (Tables 4 and 6).
The key point is that the firms that performed the worst were able to incur the
most additional liabilities, with joint stock companies controlled  by bank-sponsored
investment funds leading the way (specifications 4-6, Table 5),26  Much of those
obligations are in the form of bank loans to these firms, and as noted state influence in the
banking sector remained very strong throughout  this period. While some equilibration
may have occurred, the leverage results are also consistent with our model. Because the
banks expected to be bailed out of their non-perforrning  loans, because the banks had
incentives to assist the voucher privatized firmns,  and because the legal system was so
weak, leverage increased the most in firms that perforrned  the worst. We also control for
current and lagged performance (as measured by ROA) and results are unchanged.
Despite their relatively low profitability, Czech owned  joint stock companies took on
new liabilities at a much faster rate than other firms.
In addition to the leverage results, other data suggest that the new liabilities were
not being converted into productive assets. Regressions  of the change in the share of
intangible assets on firm types indicate that this asset type was also growing much faster
perhaps, but again qualitative results were similar whether or not liability growth was included in the
specifications.
If  "When the banks were handling NPF subsidies, for example, they were unwilling to recapitalize
the loans of potentially profitable firms. Instead, the banks propped up struggling firms that happened to be
their clients." p 77.
23at joint stock companies than at other companies. 27 In other words, the joint stock
companies, our weakest performers,  incurred the most additional liabilities, and the
increase in their leverage ratios coincided  not with an increase in relatively secure assets
28 such as cash and fixed assets, but rather with an increase in intangible assets.  Recall
that these were the firms whose output growth rates and ROA substantially  lagged those
of other firm types.  What sort of intangibles  were they acquiring? In short, the financial
structure regressions lend support to the premise that looting was present, especially
when viewed in light of the productivity regressions.
6.  Robustness Checks
A, Pooling
To the extent that firms naturally  gravitate to ownership structures  that yield the best
performance, one might expect little relationship  between equilibrium ownership
structures, such as concentration levels, and relative performance  for reasons explained
by Demsetz and Lehn (1985):
"A decision by shareholders  to alter the ownership structure of their firm
from concentrated to diffuse should be a decision made in awareness of its
consequences for loosening control over professional management. The
higher cost and reduced profit that would be associated with this loosening
in owner control should be offset by lower capital acquisition cost or other
profit-enhancing aspects of diffuse ownership if shareholders  choose to
broaden ownership. Standardizing  on other determinants of profit ...
ownership concentration and profit rate should be unrelated."
However, in the Czech Republic in the 1  990s, ownership structures were far from
equilibrium and this could have an important bearing on empirical results. For example,
if one type of owners were especially good at identifying efficient firms, their initial
return on assets might be high, regardless of their  ability to manage the firm. In the
Czech Republic, one could argue that, in the first few years after privatization, results
from regressions of performance on ownership reflected the relative abilities of the
26  The increased leverage ratios were not attributable  to asset reduction  - total reported assets at joint
stock companies tended to increase slightly over this period.
27  Results are not reported but are available from the authors.
28  Regression results for changes in the shares of fixed assets and cash are also available from the
authors.
24ownership types in selecting firms that performed well. These selection effects should be
less pronounced in regressions of performance changes on ownership. 29 The output
growth regressions are one such set of regressions.
Another potential way to confront the selection problem is to include firm-
specific fixed effects in the regressions, but this was not a viable approach for our
sample, since the time series is short for all of our firms.  For any given firm the
maximum number of observations for variables that measure change in performance,  for
example, was three.  In the vast majority of cases the actual number was two, because
most firms had not been privatized by 1993. Moreover, only one firm in our sample
experienced a change in ownership classification.
However, if one subset of owners consistently looted less (more) or governed
better (worse) than another, that advantage (disadvantage)  should eventually  be reflected
in yearly cross-sectional regressions. Results from yearly regressions, which appear in
Table 6, confirmed our expectations. Estimated coefficients for 1996 were negative and
significant for all types of non-foreign controlled  joint stock companies, and they were
larger (in absolute value) than for 1993-94.3°  Moreover, those estimates indicate that, by
1996, the disparity between fund-controlled  joint stock companies and all other firms was
at its widest.  The coefficient for fund-controlled  joint stock companies was statistically
different from those for all other firms types at at least the p=.I 0 level, except for those
joint stock companies where no dominant owner could be identified. Unlike foreign-
owned companies, which started at an initial disadvantage  but later improved their
performance, fund-controlled companies appear to have dug themselves further into a
hole.
29  Weiss and Nikitin (1998) note that, "This approach eliminates the bias stemming from the
correlation between ownership composition and initial performance  by looking only at changes in
performance.  Selectivity  bias would still arise if different types of owners had better access to information
about probable changes in performance, or if some types of owners were able to better evaluate information
about future changes in performance, or if certain owners valued changes in future performance  more than
others did. Although  this is a serious potential drawback to this study, we believe that bidders during this
period were unlikely to have sufficient private information  for this problem to significantly bias our
results." p.  15. Frydman et al. (1997) also uses rates of change (in revenues, employment,  revenue per
employee, and cost per unit of revenue) in measuring  performance.
30  Because we have only twenty-nine observations  in 1993,  we combined them with the 1994  data in
the regressions in Table 6.  Qualitative results are nearly identical when those twenty-nine observations  are
dropped.
25Foreign-owned  joint stock companies, which we argued were more likely to have
reputations at stake, were the only joint stock companies that did not under-perform
Czech limited liabilities in the cross-sectional regression for 1996. The cross-sectional
results also confirm our expectations regarding foreign-owned  limited liability
companies. In the 1993-4  cross-section,  the coefficients for foreign limited liabilities
were negative and one was statistically significant (specification 3). By 1996, estimated
coefficients were all positive; in the output growth regression, the coefficient was also
significant (specification 6). The results are consistent with the idea that foreign-owned
limited liabilities started at an initial disadvantage,  perhaps due to selection bias, if
foreigners had less information  about firms. By 1996, these firms had sufficiently
improved that their performance  levels were either statistically indistinguishable from
Czech-owned limited liabilities  or they held a slight advantage.
B.  Sample Selection Stemming  from  Timing of Privatizations
Because companies were privatized at different times, we are left with an
unbalanced panel.  If the timing of privatizations were non-random, changes in the
composition of the sample may be driving our results. For example, the 1996 cross-
sectional results in Table 6 indicate that fund-controlled  joint stock companies performed
poorly relative to other ownership  types, and substantially  worse than they had in 1993-
94.  That result, however, may be attributable  to the late addition of a number of fund-
controlled joint stock companies to the sample, companies that may not yet have had
sufficient time to establish effective governance.
To control for this possibility, specifications 1 and 2 in Table 8 include
observations from a balanced panel of the 214 firms for which we had data from 1994
through 1996. Results are largely unchanged. The coefficients for fund-controlled  joint
stock companies and those where no dominant owner was identified were negative and
significant in 1993-94. Coefficients  for other firn  types, including foreign joint stock
companies, were insignificant,  but they were statistically indistinguishable from those for
the fund-controlled and other  joint stock companies. By 1996, the coefficient for fund-
controlled joint stock companies was negative, significant,  and larger in absolute value.
Most importantly, that coefficient was now statistically different from those for foreign
26joint stock companies and foreign limited liabilities.  By contrast, the coefficient for joint
stock companies with no dominant owner did not change from 1993-94,  it achieved
significance at only the p=.  10 level, and it was not statistically  distinguishable from those
for the other ownership types. Sample selection due to the timing of privatization is not
driving our results.  Balanced panel regressions further confirm the poor relative
performance of the fund-controlled  joint stock companies.
C. Firm Size
Aside from their performance,  which we discuss below, the most striking
difference  between the joint stock companies  and the limited liabilities was their size.
Whether measured in total liabilities,  total assets, or employees,  joint stock companies
tended to be much larger than limited liabilities. The median joint stock company was
roughly seven times larger (as measured  in total assets) than the median limited liability
company (Table 3).  Within the subset of joint stock companies, those controlled by
bank-sponsored investment funds were the largest, but size differences within the subset
were much smaller than the differences between  joint stock companies and limited
liabilities. Among limited liabilities,  those controlled by foreigners  were typically much
larger than those controlled by Czech citizens but, again, not nearly as large as the typical
joint stock company. In short, different governance mechanisms were associated with
firms of different average size, and size alone may have had an impact on performance.
We therefore controlled for total assets in our base regressions.
However, to assume that performance  varies with size (as measured by total
assets) in a linear fashion may be too restrictive. We may, therefore, still be comparing
apples with oranges in our regressions. To address this concern, specifications  3 and 4 in
Table 8 include only small firms. Specification 3 includes all firms with assets below the
sample median; specification 4 includes only those firms whose assets ranked in the third
quartile of the sample. Specification  4 is probably more relevant because there were no
fund-controlled  joint stock companies that ranked in the lowest quartile in assets. Among
all firm types, the negative coefficient  for fund-controlled  joint stock companies is the
only one that is significant in both specifications. That coefficient is also statistically
distinguishable from each of the other firm types, except joint stock companies without a
27dominant owner. The coefficient for non-dominant owner  joint stock companies was not,
however, statistically  distinguishable from that for other firm types.  It does not appear
that firm size can account for our results.
D.  Capital Intensity
Another difference between joint stock and limited liability companies is that
joint stock companies in this sample tended to be more capital-intensive (as measured by
the ratio of tangible fixed assets to total assets), even after controlling for sector of
operations and size. Ifjoint stock companies had to invest more heavily, and it takes
several years for capital investments to come fully on line, it may take joint stock
companies longer to improve their performance. Consequently, they might have only
begun to generate improvements after the period under study had finished.
To address this concern, we include our measure of capit,al  intensity as an
explanatory variable in the regressions. 3'  Specification 5 in Table 8 includes the full
sample; specification 6 includes only those firms ranked in the third quartile in terms of
assets.  As expected, capital intensity is negative in both specifications, and significant  in
specification 6.  The coefficient for fund-controlled  joint stock companies is negative and
significant in both specifications, and the largest, in absolute value, for any firm type. In
the small firms specification, no other firm type has a statistically significant coefficient.
In addition, in the small firms specification, the fund-controlled coefficient is statistically
different from that for Czech joint stock companies where no do.minant  owner was
identified at the p=.05 level.  In short, performance results are similar even after
controlling for capital intensity, as well as sector and size.
E. Initial Leverage
As noted above, joint stock companies may have benefited from substantial debt
forgiveness just prior to their privatization. Fewer liabilities to service may have meant
higher initial returns on assets for those firms. However, because we wanted to bias our
analysis against the conclusion that joint stock companies, especially those controlled by
31  Similar  results  obtain  when  we measure  capital  intensity  as the ratio of tangible  fixed  assets  to
employees.  However,  we  have  employment  data  for each  firm  at only  one point  in the sample.
28funds, performed poorly, we did not include initial leverage  in our base specifications.
The last two specifications in Table 8 include initial leverage  (measured in the year in
which a firm joined the sample) as a regressor.  Specification 7 includes the full sample
of observations; specification 8 includes only those firms ranked in the third quartile in
terms of assets.
Capital intensity also appears in those regressions. As expected, both capital
intensity and initial leverage  are negative and significant in both specifications. The
coefficient for fund-controlled  joint stock companies is negative and significant in both
specifications, and the largest, in absolute value, for any firm type. Most importantly, in
the small firms specification,  the fund-controlled  coefficient is statistically different from
that for all other firm types, including those Czech joint stock companies where no
dominant  owner  was identified,  at at least  the p=.  10  level.
6.  Conclusion
We have argued that two perverse incentive were present in the Czech Republic.
One was the potential to capture greater income now through borrowing, looting and
defaulting, then could be earned in the future from maximizing the firm's economic net
worth. The other was the chance for dominant owners and/or managers to strip resources
from a firm they own in part and transfer them to a firm they own in whole or to their
personal accounts. The critical enabling factors that made asset stripping and looting
possible may have been the weak enforcement of rules on disclosure, protection of
minority shareholders, and good corporate conduct, coupled with implicit government
guarantees and biases in the allocation of credit.
The skeptic might attribute the under-performance  of fund-controlled  joint stock
companies to general failures in corporate governance rather than increased incentives  to
loot.  We have provided various pieces of evidence that undermine that interpretation.
The yearly cross-sectional results show that, while the other firm types generally
improved relative to Czech owned limited liabilities, the fund-controlled  joint stock
companies fell further behind. This, too, may be attributable  to more general failures in
corporate governance, at least for a short period. However, the key question is why the
29funds retained control of these firms if they were systematically  under-performing over
an extended period. Shouldn't they have sold to more capable owners?
Our most compelling evidence  in favor of the looting hypothesis comes from our
robustness checks. Within the subset of small firms, and controlling  for industry, capital
intensity, and initial leverage, fund-controlled  joint stock companies under-performed all
other firms. This includes not only foreign-owned  joint stock companies, but also those
Czech joint stock companies not controlled  by funds. There was not, therefore, anything
endemic to the structure of joint stock companies that ensured poor performance. All the
while, fund-controlled  joint stock companies took on liabilities at a faster rate than other
firms. It seems unlikely that general failures in corporate governance for fund-controlled
firms can explain all of these results. Looting, as described in our adaptation of the AR
model, played a role.
The Czech experience has important lessons for other privaitizing  countries. In
particular it suggests that the potential for looting must be curbed for privatization  to
succeed. Some policy makers may read the extensive literature on how to privatize to
mean that the modality of privatization  is paramount. While privatization design is
significant, it is second order compared to the creation of a competitive  and commercially
oriented banking system in which credit allocation is free of politically  motivated
interventions and self-dealing is curbed by a real threat of loss to depositors and bad
creditors. We can't say whether voucher privatization would have succeeded had there
been less opportunity for looting. But there is ample evidence from other countries to
suggest that, even if the Czechs had privatized through sales to strategic investors, the
reforms would have failed to improve  performance in those firms that had opportunities
to loot compared to firms that lacked such chances.
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33Table 2: Sample Characteristics
Year  Joint Stock Companies  Limtited  Liabilities
Observations  % of Sample  Observations  % of Sample
1993  3  1  3.0  3  0.3
1994  162  15.9  103  10.1
1995  146  14.4  201  19.8
1996  114  11.2  199  19.6
Total  453  44.5  506  49.8
Table 3: Sample Characteristics, Assets
Total Assets  Mean  1st  IOU,  Median  9  ggtn




Foreign  1182.7  114.9  156.3  544.4  3305.9  7453.7
(n=65)
Investment Fund  1390.4  69.5  182.2  636.5  3302.2  11360.5
(n=127)
Bank-Sponsored  1439  2  119.6  266.4  828.5  3417.1  7577.7
Fund (n=93)
Other  3110.2  73.8  151.2  642.5  7734.5  29420.1
(n= 168)
Limited Liabilities
Foreign-owned  488.0  4 9  25.8  159.9  1488.5  4600.7
(n=204)
Czech-owned  167.6  7.0  17.5  62.4  316.0  1208.3
(n=302)  _
34Table 4: Regression Results, Performance
Explanatory Variable  Retun on  Return  on  Return on  Return on  Output  Output
Assets  Assets  Assets  Assets  Growth  Growth
Rate  Rate
OLS
OLS  White's SE,
OLS  OLS  White's SE  Robust  Growth<  Robust
White's SE  White's SE  ROA > -.5  Regression  250%  Regression
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Total Assets  .0006  .001  -.002  ~  -.001  .001  -.001
(millions)  (.002)  (.002)  (.0006)  (.0007)  (.003)  (.004)
Foreign LL  -.026"  -.026"  -.006  -.009  .071  .045
(.012)  (.012)  (.010)  (.005)  (.043)  (.030)
JSC: Dominant Owner  -.055*  -.055"  -.022  -.015  -.150"'  -.010I
Foreign  (.026)  (.026)  (.017)  (.009)  (.042)  (.047)
JSC: Dominant Owner  -.062..  -.056  -.030"'  -.160'"  -.146
Any Domestic Fund  (009)  (.008)  (.006)  (.033)  (.032)
JSC: Dominant  -.070'
Owner Non-Bank  (.010)
Domestic Fund
JSC: Dominant Owner  -.052..
Domestic Bank Fund  (.012)
JSC: No Dominant  -.058..  -.058  -.048..  -.022"'  -.136  -.101
Owner Identified  (.012)  (.012)  (.010)  (.007)  (.047)  (.038)
State Owned  -.060  -.060  .007  .009  -.150  -.034
(.068)  (.068)  (.015)  (.017)  (.088)  (.066)
Constant  .052'*  .052''  .078..  .037  .359"'  .247-
(.020)  (.020)  (.019)  (.019)  (.084)  (.071)
Observations  1017  1017  1007  1017  617  624
R-square  .07  .07  .10  .13
F  5.95  6.11  6.45  4.38  5.33  6.40
Prob > F  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
indicates statistically significant at the p=O.1  0 level.  indicates significance at the p=0.05 level. -
indicates significance at the p=0.01 level. Standard errors in parentheses. All specifications included
dummy variables for industry and year. Output growth = (output(t)-output(t-1))/output(t);  return on assets =
pre-tax profits(t)/total assets(t). Capital intensity = Fixed Assets/Total  Assets. Initial Leverage = Total
Assets(t  l)/Total Liabilities(t- 1).
35Table 5: Regression Results, Financing
Explanatory Variable  . Leverage  ___  _Change  in Leverage
OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  Robust  Robust
White's SE  White's SE  White's SE  White's SE  Regression  Regression
Retum on Assets  -.691
(.250)
Retum on Assets [t-1]  -.916  -.088
(.152)  (.054)
Foreign LL  -.013  -.031  -.069*  .094  -.009  -.012
(.027)  (.023)  (.029)  (.092)  (.018)  (.018)
JSC: Dominant Owner  -.399.  -.437w  -397  . .160*  .024  .021
Foreign  (.029)  (.032)  (.041)  (.079)  (.027)  (.027)
JSC:  Dominant  -.330's  -.378.  -.350'  .126.  .051  .045"
Owner Non-Bank  (.021)  (.026)  (.027)  (.064)  (.021)  (.022)
Domestic Fund
JSC: Dominant Owner  -.396'*  -.432..  -.407**  .197***  .106.'  .1010
Domestic Bank Fund  (.023)  (.024)  (.028)  (.056)  (.024)  (.024)
JSC: No Dominant  -.329  *  -.369..  -.343"'  .086  .057.  .053**
Owner Identified  (.023)  (.025)  (.032)  (.052)  (.022)  (.022)
State Owned  -.038  -.077  -.052  -.019  .009  .009
(.040)  (.050)  (.050)  (.113)  (.036)  (.035)
Constant  .802"  .838*  .734.  .966**  .942-  .948*
(.056)  (.053)  (.039)  (.093)  (.042)  (.042)
Observations  1017  1017  624  624  624  624
R-square  .41  .50  .49  .03
F  46.62  56.85  37.16  2.38  2.92  2.94
Prob > F  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000
indicates statistically significant at the p=O.1O  level.  indicates significance at the p=0.05 level.
indicates significance at the p=O.O  I level.;  All specifications  also included dummy variables for industry
and year. Leverage = Total Liabilities/ Total Assets; Change in Leverage = Leverage(t)/Leverage(t-  1);
Return on Assets = Pre-tax profits(t)/Total Assets(t).
36Table 6: Regression Results,  Cross-sections
Explanatory Variable  Return on Assets  Output Growth
1993-94  1996  1993-94  1996  1993-94  1996
OLS  OLS  Robust  Robust  Robust  Robust
White's SE  White's SE  Regression  Regression  Regression  Regression
ROA>-.5  ROA>-.5
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Total Assets  -.001  -.002"  -.001  -.002  .002  -.004
(millions)  (.001)  (.001)  (.001)  (.0014)  (.005)  (.006)
Foreign LL  -.019  .018  -.026'  .010  -.035  .083"
(.019)  (.017)  (.011)  (.009)  (.047)  (.041)
JSC: Dominant Owner  -.039"  -.010  -.021  .002  -.102'  -.099
Foreign  (.019)  (.021)  (.014)  (.019)  (.058)  (.082)
JSC: Dominant Owner  -.050'  -.064".  -.030*'  -.034.  -.127"'  -.175"'
Any Domestic Fund  (.014)  (.015)  (.010)  (.011)  (.043)  (.048)
JSC: No Dominant  -.051..  -.043"'  -.024"  -.025*  -.109"  -.119'
Owner Identified  (019)  (.015)  (.011)  (.015)  (.048)  (.065)
State Owned  .002  .012  .004  .025  -.045  -.023
(.031)  (.026)  (.019)  (.024)  (.088)  (.103)
Constant  .014  .048..  .014  .094"'  .269  .287"
(.016)  (.017)  (.041)  (.029)  (.099)  (.125)
Observations  310  331  312  336  289  335
R-square  .13  .13
F  2.93  3.51  3.00  2.83  3.55  4.29
Prob > F  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
indicates statistically significant at the p=O. IO  level.  indicates  significance at the p=0.05 level
indicates significance at the p=O.O  I level. Standard  errors in parentheses  All specifications also included
dummy variables for industry. Output growth = (output(t)-output(t-  1))/output(t);  return on assets = pre-tax
profits(t)/total assets(t).
37Table 7: Distributions of Dependent Variables
Dependent  Mean  15t  lom  Median  90'  "  g1
Variable  Percentile  Percentile  Percentile  Percentile
Return on Assets  .018  -.490  -.075  .017  .124  .323
(n=1017)
Output Growth  .300  -.744  -.193  .109  .57  1  2.53
(n=624)
Leverage  .630  .065  .252  .613  .976  1.34
(n=1017)
Change in  1.06  .316  .784  1.00  1.27  3.16
Leverage  (n=624)  I_  I  _II
number of observations in parentheses; Output Growth = (Output(t)-Output(t-1))/Output(t);  Return on
assets = Pre-tax profits(t)/Total Assets(t); Leverage = Total Liabilities/ Total Assets, Change in Leverage =
Leverage(t)/Leverage(t-  1).
38Table 8: Robustness Checks
Explanatory Variable  Balanced Panel  Small Firms  Control for Capital Intensity and Initial
Leverage
ROA  ROA  ROA  ROA  ROA  ROA  ROA  ROA
(>--5)  (>-.5)  (>-,5)  (>-.5)  ('-.5)  (>-.5)  (>-.5)  ('-.5)
OLS,  OLS,  OLS,  OLS,  OLS,  OLS,  OLS,  OLS,
White's  White's  White's  White's  White's  White's  White's  White's
SE  SE  SE  SE  SE  SE  SE  SE
1994  1996  Firms  Firms  Firms  Firms
w/  wl  wl  wl
Assets<  Assets  Assets  Assets
Sample  in Third  in Third  in Third
Median  Quartile  Quartile  Quartile
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
Total Assets  -.001  -.001  -.00  -.0004
(millions)  (.001)  (.001)  (.0005)  (.0005)
Foreign LL  -.025  .003  .009  -.006  -.002  -.005  -.005  -.018
(.019)  (.022)  (.013)  (016)  (.009)  (.016)  (.009)  (.015)
JSC: Dominant Owner  -.034  -.0004  -.016  .007  -.002  .011  -.063"  -.037
Foreign  (.025)  (.022)  (.044)  (.048)  (.017)  (048)  (.019)  (.046)
JSC: Dominant Owner  -.044"'  -.057'  -.064'  -.050"  -.035'*  -.046"  -.091  -.110
Any Domestic Fund  (.014)  (.017)  (.019)  (.021)  (.010)  (.022)  (.012)  (.024)
JSC: No Dominant  - 033"  -.033*  -.038"'  -.018  -.031  -.012  -.083'*  -.075"
Owner Identified  (.017)  (018)  (.014)  (.015)  (.011)  (.016)  (.012)  (.020)
State Owned  -.031  .004  .014  -.001  .007  -005  .002  -.049
(037)  (.030)  (.029)  (.030)  (.015)  (.033)  (.014)  ( 037)
Capital Intensity  -.085"'  -.031  -.112"  -.062"
(.016)  (.026)  (.017)  (.028)
Initial Leverage  -.147'  -159"'
(017)  (.037)
Constant  .036"  .035V  .030  .059"  .101`  .069"  .213  .210
(.000)  (.000)  (.030)  (.027)  (.019)  ( 028)  ( 023)  (044)
Observations  214  214  504  250  1007  250  1007  250
R-square  .16  .15  .08  .13  .13  .13  .22  .24
F  2.67  2.85  3.32  3.21  7.62  2.77  9.61  4.97
Prob  - F  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
Iindivats satatistically  signifwant at the p=o.IO level.  incaicates  5ignificance at the p=0 05 ICvCl.  -
indicates  significance  at the p=O.OI level.  Standard  errors in parentheses.  Specifications  3-8 also included
dummy variables for industry and year. Specifications 1-2 included only dummy variables for industry.
Output growth = (output(t)-output(t-  1))/output(t);  return on assets = pre-tax profits(t)/total assets(t).
Capital intensity = Fixed Assets/Total  Assets. Initial Leverage = Total Assets(t=l)/Total Liabilities(tI).
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